Despite its small size, profilin is an amazingly diverse and sophisticated protein whose precise role in cells continues to elude the understanding of researchers 15 years after its discovery. Its ubiquity, abundance and necessity for life in more evolved organisms certainly speaks for its exterme importance in cell function. So far, three ligands for profilin have been well‐characterized in vitro: actin monomers, membrane polyphosphoinositides and poly‐L‐proline. In the years following its discovery, profilin's role in vivo progressed from that of a (...) simple actin‐binding protein which inhibits actin polymerization, to one which, as an important regulator of the cytoskeleton, can even promote actin polymerization under the appropriate circumstances. In addition, interactions with components of the phosphatidylinositol cycle and the RAS pathway in yeast implicate profilin as an important link through which the actin cytoskeleton is able to communicate with major signaling pathways. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ethical Theory and Responsibility Ethics: A Metaethical Study of Niebuhr and Levinas by Kevin JungMichael SohnEthical Theory and Responsibility Ethics: A Metaethical Study of Niebuhr and Levinas KEVIN JUNG Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011. 237 pp. $69.95In Ethical Theory and Responsibility Ethics, Kevin Jung presents a historical and constructive analysis of two of the most prominent defenders of responsibility ethics: H. Richard Niebuhr and Emmanuel Levinas. (...) The Niebuhr and Levinas specialist will find detailed, historical discussions and clear, rigorous analyses of these thinkers’ philosophical and theological thought. But where Jung’s project really makes a distinct contribution to the field of ethics—and where his work may be of interest to the nonspecialist—is when he brings their insights and oversights into critical conversation with analytic philosophy. Rendering a mutually productive dialogue, he persuasively argues that categories within analytic philosophy cohere with and clarify their respective positions; conversely, their concrete responsibility ethics may contribute to analytic philosophy. [End Page 223]Chapter 1 introduces key concepts and issues within contemporary analytic philosophy relevant to responsibility ethics; these concepts and issues resurface toward the end of the book when Jung puts them in dialogue with the ethical theories of Niebuhr and Levinas. Chapter 2 reconstructs the philosophical and theological background of Niebuhr’s moral theory, engaging a number of influential thinkers—Friedrich Schleiermacher, Albrecht Ritschl, Ernst Troeltsch, Karl Barth, Josiah Royce, and Martin Buber—who shaped his thought. Chapter 3 examines more closely Niebuhr’s responsibility ethics itself. In the next two chapters, Jung applies the same structure of analysis to Levinas’s ethical theory: he considers Levinas’s philosophical and theological context; engages the works of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Franz Rosenzweig, and Buber; and then exposits Levinas’s own distinct position. Jung traverses and navigates complex and divergent concepts and ideas proposed by Niebuhr and Levinas with clarity and finesse. His purpose is to interpret their arguments in light of their respective positions in ethical theory. In the final two chapters, Jung’s work turns more explicitly constructive when he puts their theories into conversation with analytic philosophy.The specialist in Niebuhr or Levinas studies may find that Jung’s attempts to clarify their thought with foreign, extrinsic categories do violence to their works. Indeed, on occasion Jung seems to shoehorn their ideas into analytical concepts that may not do full justice to the full breadth of their thought. For instance, Jung rightly indicates that Levinas rejects a certain kind of abstract ethical universalism on the basis of his emphasis on the concrete relation to the particular other. But to conclude from this that he is an ethical particularist does not adequately account for the categorically imperative nature of the ethical demands and responsibility to the other that Levinas proposes. In other words, it seems to me that Levinas offers a form of ethical universalism that begins precisely in the concrete situation without collapsing into an ethical particularism.Despite these minor reservations, Jung’s work is to be commended not only for its excellent exposition and rigorous studies of Niebuhr and Levinas but also for its successful attempt overall to clarify and give greater coherence to their ideas with the tools of analytic philosophy. In so doing, Jung provides robust theoretical reflection on responsibility ethics in a time of augmented human power and capacities. [End Page 224]Michael SohnCleveland State UniversityCopyright © 2014 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

This latest book, whose editors were among those who prepared the first two volumes, centers on Popkin's crucial role in bringing together scholars from around ...

This book offers a definitive and wide-ranging overview of developments in behavioral finance over the past ten years. In 1993, the first volume provided the standard reference to this new approach in finance--an approach that, as editor Richard Thaler put it, "entertains the possibility that some of the agents in the economy behave less than fully rationally some of the time." Much has changed since then. Not least, the bursting of the Internet bubble and the subsequent market decline further (...) demonstrated that financial markets often fail to behave as they would if trading were truly dominated by the fully rational investors who populate financial theories. Behavioral finance has made an indelible mark on areas from asset pricing to individual investor behavior to corporate finance, and continues to see exciting empirical and theoretical advances. Advances in Behavioral Finance, Volume II constitutes the essential new resource in the field. It presents twenty recent papers by leading specialists that illustrate the abiding power of behavioral finance--of how specific departures from fully rational decision making by individual market agents can provide explanations of otherwise puzzling market phenomena. As with the first volume, it reaches beyond the world of finance to suggest, powerfully, the importance of pursuing behavioral approaches to other areas of economic life. The contributors are Brad M. Barber, Nicholas Barberis, Shlomo Benartzi, John Y. Campbell, Emil M. Dabora, Daniel Kent, François Degeorge, Kenneth A. Froot, J. B. Heaton, David Hirshleifer, Harrison Hong, Ming Huang, Narasimhan Jegadeesh, Josef Lakonishok, Owen A. Lamont, Roni Michaely, Terrance Odean, Jayendu Patel, Tano Santos, Andrei Shleifer, Robert J. Shiller, Jeremy C. Stein, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Richard H. Thaler, Sheridan Titman, Robert W. Vishny, Kent L. Womack, and Richard Zeckhauser. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 453 PAUL HENRY (19o6-1984) Paul Henry was a renowned scholar of Plotinus and Neo-Platonism. Born in Louvain, the son of a chemistry professor at the university there, he was sent to school in England during World War I. He then returned to Belgium, and studied philosophy and theology at Louvain, and joined the Society of Jesus. He did further studies in Paris in Middle Eastern culture, and (...) studied Arabic in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. In Rome he did further studies and received an S.T.D. from the Pontifical Gregorian University, as well as a Licentiate in Sacred Scripture from the Pontifical Gregorian University. He was appointed professor at the Institut Catholique in Paris. He published several fundamental studies on Plotinus and the development of NeoPlatonism in Western thought. He and Hans Rudolf Schwyzer of Zurich collaborated on the critical edition of Plotinus's Enneads,and he and his former student, Pierre Hadot, produced the critical edition of the theological treatises of Marius Victorinus. Paul Henry made his first visit to the United States in 1952 where he was a visiting professor at Fordham. At a meeting of the American Philosophical Association that year he met Richard Popkin. They became close friends. This led to Henry being invited to be a visiting professor at the University of Iowa, to give the Foster lecture on the immortality of the soul at the University of California, Berkeley, and to his later being appointed a regular professor at the University of California, San Diego. He also was a visiting professor at the University of Pennsylvania, Duke, Northwestern, the College of New Rochelle and St. John's University in New York. Paul Henry was an important consultant and adviser to the JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy in its early years. With his vast erudition, his understanding of the different kinds of scholarship being undertaken in Europe and America, in Catholic and non-Catholic institutions, he was able to assist us in finding the best scholarly articles, the best referees and reviewers of materials in many fields. Paul Henry was a person of immense charm, vivacity and humanity. He was able to break down barriers between people of differing backgrounds, and to form deep, abiding friendships with students and scholars all over the world. He took great interest in a variety of ventures to increase learning and understanding in intellectual history. His concerns ranged from early Christian thought, pagan Neo-Platonism, the fusion of the two in Victorinus and Augustine, up to leading intellectual ideas in modern European thought such as the structuralism of LeviStrauss and the theology of Teilhard de Chardin. He encouraged young and maturing scholars in America and Europe, and tried to bring out the very best of their abilities. He encouraged the understanding of different thought systems, the appreciation of their strengths and weaknesses. And, perhaps as much as any one in the post-second-World-War period, he encouraged frank and open discussions between Catholic and non-Catholic scholars, and thereby built many bridges. Those who knew him have profited immensely from his learning, wisdom and humanity. Those who worked to launch and develop the Journal are especially grateful for his help and support in the early days of this venture. We hope that his scholarship will encourage many others to develop fresh understandings of Neo-Platonism and its importance in the philosophical, theological and scientific world, from ancient times to the present. He will be sorely missed, but he has left a great legacy to those working in the history of philosophy. RICHARD H. POPKIN... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:264 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY right at hand, without getting in the way. If it had been printed in as readable type and as elegant form as Steinmann's edition, it might be the ideal easily accessible version to familiarize us with the Pens~es as they were actually written and classified by Pascal himself. RICHARD H. POPKIN University of California, San Diego Pascal. Quinta edizione riveduta e aumentata. By Michele (...) Federico Sciacca. (Milano: Carlo Marzorati Editore, 1962. Pp. 250. 2000 L.) This Pascal by Sciacca consists of three parts. The first gives and considers the Life of Pascal (1623-1662) in connection with his complex and restless century (pp. 13--72). The second part (pp. 75-112) analyzes the relationship of Pascal with Jansenism. Pascal is both dependent on and independent of it. The Jansenists discussed while Pascal felt. Jansenism could not find a stable equilibrium between nature and grace which Jansenism either contrasted or confused while Pascal well distinguishes these two orders. They are for him heterogeneous but the lower order leads to the higher. Without God, man is misery and darkness. With God, man can do all things (p. 118). The third part (pp. 115-219) is entitled The Christian Philosopher. It shows that man is made for the infinite. The true call of humanity is religious (p. 206). The final conclusion is that Pascal can still teach us to exist (p. 216). PAUL Y. FUHRMANN Columbia Theological Seminary Louis Thomassin (1619-95), ~tude bio-bibliographique avec vingt lettres et deux textes in~dits. By Pierre Clair. (Vol. I of the series Le mouvement des idles au XVH" si~cle, Collection dirig~e par Andr~ Robinet.) (Paris: 1964. Pp. 160. NF 12.) This small volume is the first in a new series devoted to bringing to light various figures and aspects of seventeenth-century thought that have either been set aside, forgotten, or are only dimly known. Louis Thomassin (as well as Bernard Lamy who is the subject of the second volume that has appeared in this series) certainly falls in these categories. Although his name often turns up in discussions of Cartesianlsm, Jansenism, Malebranchism, etc., very little consideration is ever given to him as a fairly important personage of the time, or to his ideas and the role they played. This volume by Dr. Clair will be of much use to seventeenth-century scholars in providing the basic data about his life, his connections with several of the vital movements of the period, the fundamental bibliographical materials, as well as publishing two texts and twenty letters not before available. The biographical section (pp. 1-84) traces (a bit too episodically) Thomassin's education, his career among the Oratorians as a professor of humanities, philosophy, and theology, his possible involvements with the Jansenists, his difficulties as a result of his first published work, Dissertations sur les Conciles (1667) (suppressed the same year), his later successes for his many other works in theology, philosophy, history, and pedagogy, and his relations with various major and minor figures of the mid- and late seventeenth century, like Arnauld, Malebranche, Richard Simon, Bayle, Huet, etc. Section II (pp. 85-99) gives a detailed bibliography of Thomassin's published works, plus a list of his manuscripts located in various French libraries. This is followed by twenty letters of Thomassin, an intriguing and interesting discourse on the difference between history and science, and one on the nature of chronology, plus three letters by Thomassin's secretary, Nicolas Barat. In a brief BOOK REVIEWS 265 concluding chapter (pp. 150-52), Dr. Clair deals with "Comment lire l'oeuvre du P. Thomassin," providing much guidance to anyone who wishes to avail himself of the rich resources in Thomassin's writings. From the point of view of the history of philosophy, the most interesting aspects of Thomassin's thought seem to be (1) his "Cartesianism," that is, the extent to which he early imbibed Descartes' new ideas, and played a role in the fusion of the views of Augustine, B6rulle, and Descartes that developed in the Oratory, (2) his attempt to find a viable theory of the nature of Grace somewhere between Arnauld and Malebranche, and (3) his... (shrink)

My interest here is in the way Leo Strauss and his followers, the Straussians, have dealt with race and rights, race and slavery in the history of the United States. I want, first, to assess Leo Strauss's rather ambivalent attitude toward America and explore the various ways that his followers have in turn analyzed the Lockean underpinnings of the American “regime,” sometimes in contradistinction to Strauss's views on the topic. With that established, I turn to the account, particularly that offered (...) by Harry Jaffa, of how slavery and race comported—or did not—with the Straussian account of the political foundations of the new nation and how latter-day followers of Strauss have dealt with the persisting topic of race and racism in America. Overall, I want to make two large points. First, the Straussian commitment to superhistorical standards provides the Straussians with a moral perspective on slavery, race, and racism. Second, though race and slavery have been less than central among the concerns of most followers of Strauss, the contributions of Jaffa and others have significantly shaped the present American conservative position on race, including the idea of color-blindness. (shrink)

It is tempting to think that we have heard just about all we want or need to know about race. As the above quotes indicate, modern notions of race have always revolved around the faculty of vision, with supplementary contributions from other senses such as hearing, as Arendt notes in a tacit allusion to one mark of Jewish difference—the way they sounded when concentrated in urban settings. Yet two very recent works—Mark M. Smith's How Race Is Made and Anne C. (...) Rose's Psychology and Selfhood in the Segregated South —have much to teach us about how race has “worked”, particularly in the twentieth-century South but also, by implication, in the United States in general. Both works assume that, historically, race is no mere add-on to the self, a kind of externality that, once detected, can be relatively easily excised. Rather, it stands right at the heart of personal and group identity in a nation where race and ethnicity continue to assume surprising new shapes and forms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:212 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY with Gassendi and his studies on atomism. Yet Papi gives us very little which is not already generally known. There is but a mere hint of how atomistic philosophy was handled by the Aristotelians and to what extent they actually absorbed some of that tradition themselves. Nothing in detail is said of the process whereby atomistic and Platonic motives became coupled, not only by Bruno, (...) but by Ficino before and by Cudworth afterwards. On the credit side, however, the author does call attention to the commentary and paraphrase of Lucretius by Girolamo Frachetta of Rovigo (printed 1589), a work of some interest, which has been but little studied. Such rays of light are all too infrequent in this section and Papi is usually content to follow the conventional beaten path. For one to write a book on Bruno which breaks new ground is now difficult, for the field has been so thoroughly worked over. This one takes up a number of interesting themes found in Bruno's writings and sheds some light on them, but it seldom if ever says anything very different from the well-established tradition of Bruno scholarship in Italy which has produced so many mediocre books over the years. The specialist on Bruno and the sixteenth century will find little to detain him; the more casual reader could be ~rected to a number of superior treatments of various aspects of the Nolan's thought. In short, this study adds but little to what is already known. CHAm~V_SB. ScH~rrr University of Leeds Sir Walter Ralegh dcrivain, l'~uvre et les iddes. By Pierre Lefranc. (Qutbec: Les Presses de l'Universit~ Laval, 1968. Pp. 733. $19.50) This excellent study, the fruit of more than a dozen years of research, throws much light on Ralegh's thought and literary achievement. Lefranc has examined the manuscript sources, and unearthed quite a few new ones, and has patiently, carefully, and with much detective work, established what is no doubt the best available hypothesis of what is authentic among Ralegh's purported prose and poetic writings, and the date and circumstances of their composition. He has analyzed them in the context of Ralegh's carver, and has developed an exciting and rich interpretation of his political, philosophical and religious ideas. Ralegh's role in intellectual history derives mainly from his reputation as a Machiavellian, as an atheist, and from his mammoth, "pious," much-read providential History of the World (written during his years as a prisoner in the Tower of London). Lefranc deftly sorts and weighs the evidence for the various views and attitudes attributed to Ralegh in his own day and by interpreters ever since, and emerges from this examination with a fresh and striking picture of one of the liveliest bridge figures between the Elizabethan Renaissance and the modern world. The establishment of the canon leads to discarding as not by Ralegh many writings that have previously been used in interpreting the courtier's views. Three philosophical works which have played a role in twentieth-century interpretation, "A Treatise of the Soule," "The Prince, or Maxims of State" and "The Sceptick" are shown to be doubtful to a greater or lesser degree. "The Sceptick," which Strathmann (Sir Walter Ralegh,,4 Study in Elizabethan Skepticism, New York, 1951) had used to interpret Ralegh as a sceptical-Christian fideist, had been questioned earlier by Lefranc, Sprott, and myself. It is just a translation of portions of Book I of Sextus F_znpiricus' Outlinea of Pyrrhonism, and contains no connection with Ralegh, except that it was BOOK REVIEWS 213 published in his literary remains in 1651. Lefranc now, examining the evidence of the four manuscripts that have been discovered, concludes that it was a part of Ralegh's documentation when he was doing his research, but that 'Tattribution de 'The Sceptick' Ralegh lui-m~me ne repose sur rien" (p. 67). With the canon shorn of the dubious items, Lefranc proceeds to unfold a picture of Ralegh's intellectual world. As a practical statesman, buccaneer and explorer, Ralegh had a view of the role England should play vis-,'t-vis Spain and the New World that contained... (shrink)

This book is a practical study of the forest industrial complex composed in analogical narratives of prosaic discourse and poetic themes presented in a gallery tour through the corporate moral forest. Its focus is on the changing of management by objectives policies to management by ethics philosophies and managing moralities.

Landschenkungsurkunden hethitischer Könige. By Christel Rüster and Gernot Wilhelm. Studien zu den Boğazköy-Texten, Beiheft 4. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2012. Pp. 271, 75 plts. €94.

An exposition of human dignity as the foundation of moral order. From this starting point, the author derives the most important precepts of natural law from human dignity in a systematic way. Using the principle of human dignity, the author then develops natural law precepts to guide human behavior in various areas of life corresponding to the natural inclinations: life issues, sexual issues, political issues, and the contemplative life.

Judged by the Law of Freedom explores a paradox central to orthodox Christianity—the assertion that human beings are responsible for their own salvation yet inescapably dependent upon God for their deliverance. Christianity's attempt to maintain both these truths simultaneously has been a focal point of serious and recurrent tension throughout the Church's two thousand year history. Judged by the Law of Freedom proposes a resolution for this paradox founded upon the metaphysical apparatus offered by St. Thomas Aquinas.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS Shadow History tl9 Richard Watson's essay looks as if it is breaking new ground, but on re-re-reading it, it seems to me that several incommensurable and unrelated problems and phenomena are being treated together. If separated into constituent parts, there may be less here than meets the eye. First of all, the phenomenon of "shadow history," and its role as foundation for a philosophy or (...) a philosophical position goes back, I think, at least to Aristotle's account of his predecessors, especially of his teacher, and beyond that perhaps to Plato's account of the Sophists. It appears in Maimonides's account of Arabic occasionalism, which was used to justify medieval Aristotelianism (and this account was accepted uncritically by Leibniz, Malebranche, and others in the seventeenth century). Bacon's, Descartes's, and Locke's presentation of Scholasticism is definitely "shadow history" that was used as the start of the "new" way of ideas, and as its justification.. Hegel's view of the history of philosophy is another major "shadow history." Hence the fact that Russell, Ayer, Ryle and Rorty adopted similar strategies of using a spurious or dubious history of their predecessors is not so strange. Any historian of philosophy worth her or his salt is aware that historical philosophical personnages have used their own views of their predecessors' philosophies as ways of making their own "original" philosophical views more exciting or important or credible. We have learned long ago how to separate the alleged past from the historical past, and even to see that the alleged past plays a significant role in the writings of various philosophers. Watson has put it neatly in his four examples, but these are only intriguing because so litde history of analytic philosophy has been written up to this time. We have much, maybe too much, literature about how Kant misrepresented Hume, Hume misrepresented Berkeley, etc. In the decades to come we may have much about Russell, Ayer, Ryle and Rorty as misrepresenters. Then, Watson's point can help separate the charge that they were poor historians from the realization that they used history creatively as "shadow history." And we may even have historical evidence from the Russell papers and other archives that they knew full well what they were doing, and were not pretending to be good historians, or, on the other hand, that they themselves did not realize they were writing "shadow history," but thought they were actually real historians. Watson tries to make the activity of creating "shadow history" a challenge to historians of philosophy, and a plus for the creative philosophers. In the cases he discusses the "shadow histories" have had great influence on the development of twentiethcentury philosophy in England and America. Even though I am a sceptic, I have no doubt that historians of Anglo-American philosophy will explore his points, and distinguish the "shadow histories" from the best available historical interpretations of what previous philosophers said and meant. Both interpreting and understanding the "shadow histories" and the best available histories will change and develop depending on future interests and information. Watson uses "historians" without really making clear who he is talking about. Only three people are mentioned: Gregor Sebba, Etienne Gilson and Paul Oskar Kristeller. 120 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 31 : 1 JANUARY 1993 There are many others who consider themselves historians of philosophy, or are considered as such in the profession; I doubt that they are all as objectivist as Watson thinks, believing that they can ascertain exactly what happened in the past. But I think most of us share a view that we can do better or worse at this, depending on materials and techniques used, perspectives employed, etc. Almost all of us would contend that being able to read the basic source material in the original language and being able to understand it in context, yields a better understanding of what a historical philosopher said and meant. Watson appears to agree, but then says this does not matter, because a "shadow history" may be longer remembered and used in creative philosophy than a historian's history. The example he offers is that of Yolton's Locke... (shrink)

Science has had a profound influence in shaping contemporary perspectives of reality, yet few in the public have fully grasped the profound implications of scientific discoveries. This book describes three intellectual revolutions that led to the current scientific consensus, emphasizing how science over the centuries has undermined traditional, religious worldviews. The author begins in ancient Greece, where the first revolution took place. Beginning in the sixth-century BCE, a series of innovative thinkers rejected the mythology of their culture and turned to (...) rational analysis and the empirical study of reality. This change in thinking, though it lay dormant for the many centuries of Christian hegemony in the West, eventually gave rise to the Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries--the second revolution. Highlighted by such luminaries as Kepler, Galileo, and Isaac Newton, the Enlightenment laid the foundations for our current understanding of the world. Today we live amidst the third scientific revolution, including Darwin's theory of evolution, Planck's concept of the quantum, Einstein's relativity theories, Bohr's quantum mechanics, along with Watson and Crick's decoding of the human genome with the prospect of improving human nature. Besides technological wonders, this revolution has also supported widespread respect for freedom of thought, greater educational opportunities, and democratic governments. Looking to the future, Schlagel sees many exciting possibilities yet also potentially devastating threats to the environment. He underscores the need for widespread scientific literacy, stressing that only unfettered scientific inquiry offers a realistic hope of overcoming these daunting challenges. (shrink)

Rethinking Justice lifts up and restores an idea of justice found in classical writers as well as more recent thinkers. Justice deals with righting wrongs and restoring peace to individuals and communities. We have lost sight of this and must return to it in mind and practice.

IT IS A REMARKABLE TRIBUTE TO HUME that of all past philosophical views, his critique of causality is nearly unique in being considered as true today as when he first proposed it over two centuries ago. Arthur Fine, for example, states, "I think we ought to follow Hume's prescription on induction with regard to the external world," while Quine flatly claims that "the Humean predicament is the human predicament." Despite the glaring fact that Hume's skepticism was induced by the severe (...) limitations of scientific knowledge and the paucity of causal explanations at the time, most philosophers continue to believe that his analysis of causality conforms to our present level of scientific understanding. Yet just a glance at the difference in scientific knowledge should rattle that presumption. (shrink)

A thought-provoking and timely call to apply Judaism's powerful teachings to help shift our imperiled planet onto a sustainable path. While appreciating the radical, transformative nature of Judaism, Richard Schwartz argues that it has been "stolen" by Jews who are in denial about climate change and other environmental threats and support politicians and policies that may be inconsistent with basic Jewish values. Tackling such diverse issues as climate change, world hunger, vegetarianism, poverty, terrorism, destruction of the environment, peace prospects (...) in Israel, and American foreign policy, he offers practical suggestions for getting Judaism back on track as a faith based on justice, peace, and compassion. He urges the reader to reconsider current issues in line with Judaism's highest values in an effort to meet the pressing challenges of today's world. (shrink)